Volume 16
Issue 2 Volume 16, Issue 2, 2019

Article 1

12-31-2019

CORPORATE POLITICAL CONNECTION AND AUDIT QUALITY
Putri Armadiyanti,
Universitas Airlangga, p.armadiyanti@gmail.com

Sri Iswati
Universitas Airlangga, iswati@feb.unair.ac.id

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/jaki

Recommended Citation
Armadiyanti,, Putri and Iswati, Sri (2019) "CORPORATE POLITICAL CONNECTION AND AUDIT QUALITY,"
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia: Vol. 16: Iss. 2, Article 1.
DOI: 10.21002/jaki.2019.07
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/jaki/vol16/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Economics & Business at UI Scholars Hub.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia by an authorized editor of UI
Scholars Hub.

122

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Desember 2019, Vol. 16, No. 2, hal 122-140

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia
Volume 16 Nomor 2, Desember 2019
CORPORATE POLITICAL CONNECTION AND AUDIT QUALITY
Putri Armadiyanti
Program Studi Magister Akuntansi, Universitas Airlangga1
p.armadiyanti@gmail.com
Sri Iswati
Program Studi Akuntansi, Universitas Airlangga2
iswati@feb.unair.ac.id
Abstract
Indonesia offers interesting conditions to explore research on political connections because
Indonesia is a country with an emerging market and a history of strong political connections
in business. This study aims to empirically examine the effect of corporate political connections on audit quality and whether the effect of political connections on auditor selection is
moderated by earnings management behavior. This study used a sample of all companies
from all sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2015-2017 period,
except for companies from the financial industry sector, with a total of 1,213 firm-years. The
analysis technique used was logistic regression. The results revealed that politically connected boards of commissioners and directors in a company had a positive and significant
effect on audit quality, meaning that companies with political connections tended to select
industry specialist auditors as the company’s external auditors. The results also revealed
that earnings management did not moderate the effect of corporate political connections on
audit quality. This study provides new insights on the use of political connections in the
business environment, especially in the quality of audits in Indonesia.
Keywords: Political connection, Profit management, Audit quality

Abstrak
Indonesia menawarkan kondisi yang menarik untuk mengeksplorasi penelitian tentang koneksi politik, karena Indonesia merupakan negara dengan pasar berkembang dengan sejarah
koneksi politik yang kuat dalam bisnis. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris
bagaimana pengaruh antara koneksi politik yang dimiliki orang dalam perusahaan terhadap
kualitas audit dan apakah pengaruh antara koneksi politik dan pemilihan auditor dimoderasi
oleh perilaku manajemen laba. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel seluruh perusahaan dari
seluruh sektor yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2015-2017 kecuali perusahaan sektor industri keuangan sejumlah 1.213 tahun-perusahaan (firm-years). Teknik analisis yang digunakan yaitu analisis regresi logistik. Hasil penelitian mengungkapkan bahwa
perusahaan dengan dewan komisaris dan direksi yang terhubung secara politik berpengaruh
positif dan signifikan terhadap kualitas audit, artinya perusahaan dengan koneksi politik
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cenderung memilih auditor spesialis industri sebagai auditor eksternal perusahaan. Hasil juga
mengungkapkan bahwa manajemen laba tidak memoderasi pengaruh koneksi politik perusahaan terhadap kualitas audit. Penelitian ini memberikan wawasan baru tentang pemanfaatan
koneksi politik dalam lingkungan bisnis terutama dalam kualitas audit di Indonesia.
Kata kunci: Koneksi Politik, Manajemen Laba, Kualitas Audit

INTRODUCTION
During the Joko Widodo and Jusuf
Kalla (Jokowi-JK) administration, there
were several names of people who were appointed as commissioners of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOE). Some of these people
were those who were connected as part of
the national campaign team of Jokowi-JK or
members of the supporting parties of
Jokowi-JK administration (Asril 2015; Sudrajat 2017), for example, Cahaya Dwi
Rembulan Sinaga, a politician from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P) who was appointed as independent
commissioner of PT Bank Mandiri; Jefry
Wurangian (politician of the Nasdem Party)
who was appointed as commissioner of PT
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI); Roy E. Maningkas (politician of PDI-P) who was appointed as commissioner of PT Krakatau
Steel; Imas Aan Ubudiah (politician of National Awakening Party (PKB)) who was
appointed as independent commissioner of
PT Wijaya Karya; Dolfie Othniel Fredric P.
(survey team coordinator of the national
campaign team of Jokowi-JK) who was appointed as commissioner of Telkom Indonesia; Fadjroel Rachman (Coordinator of
Relawan Dua Jari (Two-Finger Volunteers))
who was appointed as the chief commissioner of PT Adhi Karya, and many more. In
Indonesia, a corruption scandal in a government project committed by Teuku Bagus
Mokhamad Noor, top brass of PT Adhi Karya, Tbk, who was found guilty of offering
bribes to a number of government officials
and members of the House of Representatives (DPR) to enable the enterprise to ob-

tain contracts for the construction of Education and Training Center and the National
Sports School in Bukit Hambalang, illustrates that enterprise’s top officials may
abuse authority for their personal benefit or
the benefit of others (Maharani 2014).
This phenomenon illustrates that the
involvements of politicians in business,
business people in politics, state civil officials in related political and business activities, and also the dependence of political
parties on contributions from companies/businesses as a source of funding contribute to the significance of political connections in business (Narayanaswamy
2013). Executive officers who have political
connections are usually considered powerful
because they can take advantage of various
privileges such as to strengthen their position and influence company profits (Khan et
al. 2016).
The effect of political connections on
companies has drawn a lot of attention from
several previous studies, such as studies on
the effect of political connections on access
to finance (Claessens et al. 2008), firm value
(Fisman 2001), tax rates (Adhikari et al.
2006), tax aggressiveness (Kim and Zhang
2016), loan costs (Houston et al. 2014), and
earnings quality (Chi et al. 2016; Cho and
Song 2017; Hashmi et al. 2018; Narayanaswamy 2013). Previous studies have
shown that political connections may exist
in both developed and developing countries,
including Indonesia. Indonesia is a country
with a developing market and a history of
strong political connections in business
(Harymawan and Nowland 2016). Companies that have political connections in
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Indonesia are very dependent on the benefits
of their connections (Fisman 2001).
Faccio (2006) stated that a company
was said to have political connections if one
of the company’s executives (CEO, president, vice president, chairman, or secretary)
or one of the largest shareholders (at least
shareholder who controls 10% of the total
shares with voting rights) ever or currently
served as a parliament member, minister, or
individual that was closely related to politicians or political parties. In addition to
providing benefits to business continuity,
corporate political connections can influence
the decision to select an external auditor
(Cheng et al. 2015; Guedhami et al. 2014;
Habib et al. 2017; He et al. 2015; Liu et al.
2017) . The decision to select an independent external auditor as a monitoring role on
behalf of the owner/shareholder becomes an
important component of corporate governance because it can help improve the credibility of accounting information provided by
management (Abdel-Khalik 2002; Lin and
Liu 2009). The reason why companies select
certain auditors is complex and tends to vary
across companies (Knechel et al. 2008; Lin
and Liu 2009).
There is a difference of opinion between hiring a qualified auditor (as an indication that the company is conducting effective audit monitoring and good corporate
governance to reduce the cost of increasing
company capital) and hiring a less qualified
auditor (to maintain earnings management
due to poor corporate governance and less
transparent disclosures). Differences in opposing views related to companies with political connections in their decision to select
an external auditor have been illustrated in
several previous studies. From a positive
point of view, Guedhami et al. (2014) revealed that companies with political connections would tend to appoint high-quality auditors (from “Big Four” accounting firms) as
a binding mechanism to reduce agency prob-

lems and suspicion of information asymmetry. In addition, companies with political
connections were more likely to appoint
high-quality auditors to show that people
within these companies wanted to increase
accounting transparency and convinced investors that they refrained from exploiting
their connections to divert corporate resources. In agency theory, the appointment
of auditors with high competence by companies with political connections reflects
bonding costs to reduce residual agency
costs.
From a negative point of view, Cheng
et al. (2015) revealed that companies with
political connections (CEOs who had connection to politics, local-owned enterprises,
and state-owned enterprises) tended to employ poor-quality auditors (non-top-10 auditors). It indicated that the company was less
concerned with monitoring and the role of
audit information. Corporate managers with
political connections who pursue their own
political profits tend to appoint underqualified auditors (non-top-10 auditors) as a
means of covering up their earnings management behavior. The company does not
want to appoint industry specialist auditors
to improve audit quality because the stock
market does not always offer sufficient incentives. Habib et al. (2017) also supported
the finding and stated that politically connected companies in Indonesia tended to appoint poor-quality (less-reputable/non-big-4)
auditors. Companies with political connections tended to appoint non-big-4 auditors
when these companies were involved in significant third-party transactions.
Some of these opposing views indicate
that corporate political connections have influenced the decision to select qualified or
less-qualified auditors. Specifically, politically connected business leaders have an
opportunistic incentive to manage earnings
in order to maintain reputation and reduce
political costs (Hu et al. 2012) so they are
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more likely to appoint less-qualified auditors
to cover these suspicious activities (Cheng et
al. 2015) . Politically connected business
leaders prefer to hire auditors who will be
more willing to hide specific information
and dubious company activities in order to
protect their political interests (Guedhami et
al. 2009). The demand for good-quality auditors will decrease when the incentive for
politically connected company officials to
manage earnings increases. Thus, earnings
management may moderate the relationship
between political connections and auditor
selection decisions.
Based on the phenomena and previous
studies, this study aims to empirically examine the effect of political connections of
people in the company on audit quality and
whether the effect of political connections
on audit quality is moderated by earnings
management behavior. This study develops
a previous study (Cheng et al. 2015; Guedhami et al. 2014; Habib et al. 2017; He et al.
2015; Liu et al. 2017; Narayanaswamy
2013) with some motivation. The first motivation is the existence of opposing views
from previous studies regarding the effect of
corporate political connections on auditor
selection decision, which becomes a research gap. The second motivation is that
there have been several previous studies in
Indonesia (Butje and Tjondro 2015; Hardianti 2014; Lestari and Putri 2017; Mulyani
et al. 2016; Siregar and Widyawati 2016)
that discussed a lot about the effect of political connections that lead to tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance, so now, this study
tries to give an insight into the effect of corporate political connections on audit quality.
Furthermore, the third motivation is previous research that discussed the effect of political connections on auditor selection
(Cheng et al. 2015; Guedhami et al. 2014;
Habib et al. 2017; He et al. 2015; Liu et al.
2017; Narayanaswamy 2013). The majority
used proxy measures of Public Accounting
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Firms, which were assumed to be goodquality auditors and poor-quality auditors, so
this study tries to use another measurement
dimension of audit quality with the proxy of
industrial specialist auditors and industrial
non-specialist auditors. Industry specialist
auditors play an important role in providing
high-quality audit because specialist auditors
must have practical experience gained from
auditing in certain industries, in addition to
specific knowledge (Habbash and Alghamdi
2017). The fourth motivation is that previous
studies (Cheng et al. 2015; Guedhami et al.
2014; Habib et al. 2017; He et al. 2015; Narayanaswamy 2013) used political connection measures and used binary indicator variables to indicate whether a company had
political connections, so variations in the
strength of connections were less revealed.
This study attempts to establish measurements of political connections used by Liu et
al. (2017), which employed political connection score index with various position levels
by adjusting to the context in Indonesia.
This study used a sample of all companies from all sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period
2015-2017. This period was chosen because
this study wanted to reveal the political conditions in the Jokowi-JK administration
based on the phenomenon of the members of
campaign team and supporting parties of
Jokowi-JK who served as state-owned enterprises commissioners after the 2014 Presidential Election. Indonesia offers interesting
conditions to explore this research topic because political connections affect corporate
value (Fisman 2001) and Indonesia is a
country with a developing market and a history of strong political connections in business (Harymawan and Nowland 2016).
This study provided empirical evidence that during the 2015-2017 period, politically connected companies in Indonesia
did not use their political connections to select auditors who could protect and cover
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companies’ political interests. The results of
this study might also provide an overview
for investors and other institutions (private,
public, or state-owned companies) regarding
the reasons why politically connected companies appoint industry specialist auditors as
their external auditors. Then, this study also
provided other measurement alternatives to
the variables of political connections and
audit quality that can be used for further research. The analysis technique used in this
study was logistic regression analysis.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
POTHESIS FORMULATION

HY-

Audit Quality (Industry Specialist and
Non-Specialist Auditors)
Agency problems increase the need for
third-party guarantees and audit quality
(Alfraih 2017). Cited from Alfraih (2017)
and Abbott and Parker (2000), Dopuch and
Simunic (1980) argued that audit requirements were closely related to agent needs.
The decision to select independent external
auditor as a monitoring role on behalf of
owner/shareholder becomes an important
component of corporate governance because
it can help improve the credibility of accounting information provided by management (Abdel-Khalik 2002; Lin and Liu
2009). However, external audits only provide valuable information about companies’
financial statements when they are of sufficient quality (Quick et al. 2013). Chang et
al. (2009) assumed that all external auditors
might not offer the same quality of service.
The reason why companies select certain auditors is complex and tends to vary
across companies (Knechel et al. 2008; Lin
and Liu 2009). There is a trade-off between
hiring qualified auditors (as an indication
that a company is conducting effective audit
monitoring and good corporate governance
to reduce the cost of increasing company
capital) and hiring less-qualified auditors (to

maintain earnings management as a result of
poor corporate governance and less transparent disclosures).
The auditor has the duty to provide
certainty to the credibility of the information
presented in financial statements. The
knowledge of an auditor is not only limited
to auditing and accounting, but an auditor
must also understand their client’s business
industry. Balsam et al. (2003) argued that
industry specialist auditors offered a higher
level of assurance than non-specialist auditors because of their specialized knowledge
of the industry and accounting in the industry. Therefore, the appointement of auditors
who specialize in industry will help reduce
earnings management. Auditors who specialize in their client’s industry are expected
to provide higher level of audit quality than
non-specialist auditors (Abbott and Parker
2000). Industry specialist auditors play an
important role in providing high-quality audit because specialist auditors must have
practical experience gained from auditing in
certain industries in addition to specialized
knowledge (Habbash and Alghamdi 2017).
Analysis from Porter (1985) showed
that public accounting firms had the motivation to provide special services that met the
needs of clients by differentiating themselves from their competitors. Differentiation may occur on many dimensions of client characteristics and demands of related
service. Dimensions of these characteristics
include size, number of segments, industry
affiliation, regulations, capital resources, and
relations of management/audit personnel.
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) argued that the
client’s industry affiliation was an important
dimension that public accounting firms
could use to align themselves with certain
client characteristics and service needs. The
market share of public accounting firm with
industry specialization reflects the efforts
made by auditors to specialize in their client’s industry.
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Hypothesis Formulation
Effects of Political Connections on Audit
Quality
Based on agency theory proposed by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), companies
with political connections are closely related
to the emergence of agency conflicts, tend to
minimize the disclosure of key information
(Rodríguez et al. 2007), and tend to issue
poor quality financial statements (AlDhamari and Ku Ismail 2015; Chung et al.
2005). Companies with political connections
have little incentive to report high-quality
earnings compared to companies without
political connections (Chaney et al. 2011;
Hashmi et al. 2018; Narayanaswamy 2013).
Cheng et al. (2015) revealed a result
that there was a significant negative effect of
corporate political connections on auditor
selection decision. These results indicated
that companies with political connections
tended not to employ qualified auditors
(non-top-10 auditors). It also indicated that a
company lacked awareness of the role of
monitoring and audit information. Corporate
managers with political connections who
pursue their own political profit tend to appoint under-qualified (non-top-10) auditors
as a means of covering up their earnings
management behavior. In addition, companies with political connections do not want
to appoint industry specialist auditors to improve audit quality because the stock market
does not always offer sufficient incentives.
Habib et al. (2017) also revealed the
results that corporate political connections
had a significant negative effect on auditor
selection decisions. This result indicated that
companies with political connections in Indonesia tended to appoint under-qualified
auditors (non-big-4 auditors). Companies
with political connections generally manipulate quantitative data in financial statements
to hide their actual economic performance,
so they are more likely to select less-
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qualified auditors. Companies with political
connections tend to appoint less-qualified
auditors when the company is involved in
significant third-party transactions. Companies with political connections avoid big-4
auditors because big-4 auditors are considered as high-quality auditors who are competent to detect corporate misconduct. In
addition, this is also because the big-4 public
accounting firms avoid risky clients to reduce litigation costs and maintain their reputation.
As such, it makes sense to hypothesize
that companies with a board of commissioners or board of directors who have political
connections are more likely to appoint nonspecialist auditors to hide information about
the company’s actual performance as contained in the financial statements in order to
strengthen their political policies and objectives and to maintain earnings management
due to poor corporate governance and lesstransparent disclosures. With this background, the hypothesis formulated is as follows:
H1 :

Corporate political connections
negatively affect audit quality.

Earnings Management as a Moderating
Role of The Effect of Corporate Political
Connections on Audit Quality
Liu et al. (2018) documented that rentseeking activities lead to higher earnings
management (in the case of discretionary
accruals), which in turn results in poorquality accounting information being revealed to the market. Rent-seeking can be
evaluated within a theoretical economic
framework of self-preservation (Karni and
Schmeidler 1986). In this framework, rational executives that are involved in rentseeking activities in companies tend to take
appropriate actions that lead to bad actions
for self- preservation.
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Given the drive to protect oneself,
there are two main reasons that link rentseeking with earnings management. First,
Liu et al. (2018) argued that when rentseeking companies were involved in corruption, bribery, or reciprocal relationship to get
assistance from government officials, company’s executives tended to take action to
preserve themselves. That was because rentseeking activities made company’s executives nervous and damaged the morale of
employees if the employees who were involved in it became known to the public or
were caught committing acts of wrongdoing.
If rent-seeking company’s executives
are rational, they will take a conservative
approach to conceal the benefits of their
rent-seeking activities by revealing a little
company profile to minimize public scrutiny. As such, executives will cover up reliable information to protect themselves from
public scrutiny through earnings management. Earnings management is used to hide
company-specific information, so it becomes
an important indicator of accounting information quality (Liu et al. 2018). Scott (2003)
stated that one of the motivations of managers to manage earnings was political motivation.
The second motivation was the risk of
political gains related to self-preservation.
After accumulating economic benefits from
the government, rent-seeking companies can
attract the attention of corrupt government
officials. Corrupt government officials have
an incentive to exploit the situation for their
personal interests. That is, officials can be
involved in political profits from rentseeking companies. To minimize this risk of
political profits, rent-seeking companies
have incentives to reduce corporate governance and hide their investment and cash
holdings (Caprio et al. 2011; Smith 2016).
Rent-seeking theory is associated with
companies with political connections and
earnings management because rent-seeking

involves economic activities that directly or
indirectly benefit government officials (Liu
et al. 2018). Companies with political connections are closely related to the emergence
of agency conflicts, tend to minimize the
disclosure of key information (Rodríguez et
al. 2007), and tend to report poor quality financial statements (Al-dhamari and Ku Ismail 2015; Chung et al. 2005). Specifically,
politically connected company’s executives
have an opportunistic incentive to manage
earnings in order to maintain reputation and
reduce political costs (Hu et al. 2012).
Previous studies have shown that there
is a negative relationship between corporate
political connections and earnings quality
(Chaney et al. 2011; Hashmi et al. 2018; Narayanaswamy 2013). It means that companies with political connections have little
incentive to report high-quality earnings
compared to companies with no political
connections. Politically connected companies in Indonesia avoid foreign financing
that demands greater transparency and
makes it difficult for them to gain personal
benefits from political connections (Leuz
and Oberholzer-Gee 2006).
Therefore, the executives of politically
connected companies tend to prefer to hire
auditors who will be more willing to hide
specific information and dubious company
activities in order to protect their political
interests (Guedhami et al. 2009). Thoughts
that lead to managerial opportunism can encourage management to appoint lessqualified auditors to ensure their opportunistic practices remain hidden. Based on this
argument, the hypothesis formulated is as
follows:
H2: Earnings management reinforces
the negative effect of political connections on audit quality.
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RESEARCH METHODS
Samples and Data Sources
This study sampled all companies
from all sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (IDX) for the period 2015-2017,
except for companies from the financial sector. Companies from the financial industry
sector (SIC 8) were excluded from the criteria because of the different nature of their
financial statements and accounting practices (Habbash and Alghamdi 2017;
Harymawan and Nowland 2016). The research sampling technique was purposive
sampling. The criteria for the company being sampled were:
1. Companies that were listed on the IDX
during the 2015-2017 period
2. Companies that were not delisted during
the study period
3. Companies that provided data needed in
their annual and financial statements
4. Financial statements audited and ended
on December 31
Based on the criteria, the total sample
of companies obtained in this study was
1,213 firm-years.
Data Analysis Techniques and Research
Models
The equation model used in this study are:
ACi,t

ACi,t

ACi,t

= α+β1PCONi,t
+β2SIZEi,t+β3DERi,t+β4BIND
i,t+β5BDIV i,t+β6BSIZE i,t+ εi..............(1)
= α+β1PCONi,t+β2DACCi,t+β3SIZEi,t+β
4DERi,t+β5BINDi,t+β6BDIVi,t+β7BSIZ
Ei,t+
εi.............(2)
= α+β1PCONi,t+β2DACCi,t+β3PCONxD
ACCi,t+β4SIZEi,t+β5DERi,t+β6BINDi,t+
β7BDIVi,t + β8BSIZEi,t + εi.................(3)
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Annotation:
ACi,t

= audit quality of company i in

PCONi,t

= corporate political connections

DACC i,t

= discretionary

SIZEi,t
DERi,t

=
=

BIND i,t

=

BDIV i,t

=

BSIZE i,t

=

ε

=

period t
of corporate i in period t
accruals
(DACC) of company i in
period t
Size of company i in period t
leverage of company i in
period t
Proportion of independent
board of directors of company
i in period t
Female representation on the
board of directors of company
i in period t
Size of the board of directors
of company i in period t
Error term

The first hypothesis was tested using
Equation Model 1, while the second hypothesis was tested using Equation model 3. The
analysis technique used was logistic regression analysis and moderated regression
analysis (MRA), which were processed with
the help of WARP PLS 6.0.
Measurement of Audit Quality
The dependent variable in this study
was audit quality. In this study, audit quality
variable was measured by using industrial
specialist and non-specialist auditors. Previous studies discussing the effect of political
connections on audit quality (Cheng et al.
2015; Guedhami et al. 2014; Habib et al.
2017; He et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2017; Narayanaswamy 2013) mostly used proxy measure of public accounting firm that was assumed to be qualified and less-qualified auditors. Thus, this study employed another
measurement dimension of auditor selection
with proxies of industry specialist and nonspecialist auditors. Auditors with certain
industry specialization are expected to
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provide a higher level of audit quality than
non-specialist auditors (Abbott and Parker
2000). Industry specialist auditors play an
important role in providing high-quality audit because specialist auditors must have
practical experience gained from auditing in
certain industries in addition to special
knowledge (Habbash and Alghamdi 2017).
Most of the previous studies (Alzoubi
2017; Balsam et al. 2003; Habbash and Alghamdi 2017; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003)
showed that industry specialist auditors
played an important role in providing highquality audit. Balsam et al. (2003) argued
that industry specialist auditors offered a
higher level of assurance than non-specialist
auditors because of the auditor's specialized
knowledge of the industry and accounting in
the industry. Therefore, the appointment of
industry-specialist auditors will help reduce
earnings management. Auditors who specialize in the client’s industry are expected
to provide higher level of audit quality than
non-specialist auditors (Abbott and Parker
2000).
In this study, the market share approach was used as a measurement for industry specialist auditors. It is because this
approach illustrates that public accounting
firms have a greater market share compared
to their comepetitors in certain industries.
Thus, public accounting firms with the largest market share have improved knowledge
in certain industries and indicated important
investments by developing the industry in
certain audit technologies (Lowensohn et al.
2007; Neal and Riley 2004).
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) argued
that public accounting firms with large market shares were able to widen industryspecific knowledge and expertise that lead to
higher quality services than the quality service of public accounting firms with small
market shares. A public accounting firm is
considered a specialist in the industry when
it has the largest market share based on cli-

ent sales or the number of clients audited by
the firm. In addition, public accounting
firms with the largest market share can develop their knowledge in the industry and
increase their understanding of sensitive issues related to the industry. A public accounting firm is categorized as an industry
specialist if it controls a market share of
20% or more of the total companies in the
industry (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). The
calculation of industry specialist auditors
(AC) in this study only covered public companies. The percentage of industry specialist
auditors (AC) is calculated as follows:

Furthermore, the value of the industry
specialization auditor was measured by a
dummy variable that was coded as 1 if the
public accounting firm was an industry specialist (controlled market share) and coded
as 0 if the public accounting firm was not an
industry specialist.
Measurement of Political Connection
Faccio (2006) stated that a company
was said to have political connection if one
of the company’s executives (CEO, president, vice president, chairman, or secretary)
or one of the largest shareholders (at least
shareholder who controlled 10% of the total
shares with voting rights) has ever served or
currently serves as parliament member, minister, or individual closely related to politicians or political parties. In Indonesia, the
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports
and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) regulates
the categories of service users who have the
potential to commit money laundering. In
the regulation of the INTRAC (2015, p. 3), it
is stated that Politically Exposed Person
(abbreviated as PEP) is defined as:
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“Individuals who have or used to
have public authorities, including
among others State Officials as defined in the law and regulation
concerning State Officials; and/or
individuals who are members or
used to be the members of a political parties having power to influence the parties’ policies and operations; and they are either Indonesians or foreign citizens.”

From this definition, individuals who
can be categorized as PEP are, for example,
the president and vice president of Indonesia; minister and equivalent position; governor and vice governor; regent or mayor;
members of the People's Consultative Assembly that includes the House of Representatives and the Regional Representative
Council; heads and directors of state-owned
enterpises and local-owned enterprises, and
heads of political parties, high-ranking military and police officers; high-ranking members of the judiciary; managers or members
of political parties and other positions mentioned in this regulation, as well as immediate family members of PEP, including second-degree relatives. If the board of directors and the board of commissioners have
one of the criteria above, then it can be said
that the company has political connections.
In this study, the measurement criteria
for defining companies that had political
connections (PCON) was the approach that
was proposed by Liu et al. (2017), which
used a political connection score index with
various ranks of positions in the bureaucracy. Measurement criteria with the approach
of Liu et al. (2017) was used by adjusting to
the context of regulation of the INTRAC in
Indonesia. Steps in measuring companies
that had political connections (PCON) were
based on the approach that was proposed by
Liu et al. (2017) with some modifications.
The first modification was the identification
of politically connected directors and com-
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missioners based on informations about personal career background that were collected
manually from company annual reports via
searches on Google.
The second modification was by giving a score to company’s executives who
had political connections in accordance with
the highest classification of positions based
on regulations in Indonesia. In the regulation
of the INTRAC (2015), Politically Exposed
Person or PEP is classified into 5 categories
(see Table 1) so that this study added 5
scores based on the classification of the
highest to the lowest positions. The third
modification was by giving a score of 5 for
the classification of the highest position and
a score of 1 for the classification of the lowest position. A score of 0 was given if the
company had no political connections. Highlevel positions have greater political power
and greater access to political and economic
resources. Thus, the highest to lowest position classification provided a measure of the
level of political relations. If a company’s
executive currently holds (or has previously
held) several positions in the government or
politics mentioned in Table 1, then all scores
from these positions were added up and averaged when connection scores were input.
Meanwhile, the fourth scores were input.
Meanwhile, the fourth modification was that
after inputting the scores of each company’s
executive, the scores of each company were
then added together.
Measurement of Profit Management
Earnings management variable was
proxied using discretionary accruals from
the modified Jones model. The modified
Jones model was used because compared to
other models, this model is considered as the
best model in detecting earnings management as well as providing the most reliable
results (Dechow et al. 1995). In this study,
regression was conducted for each industry
which was divided into 8.
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Table 1
The Scores of Political Connection and Politically Connected Position Group
No
Politically Connected Position Group
Score of Political
Connection
1
State officials
5
2
Heads of government agencies at first echelon level
4
3

Officials who have strategic functions, i.e.
a) Directors, commissioners, and other structural
officials in state-owned enterprises and/or localowned enterprises;
b) Presidents of state universities
c) First echelon officials and other officials who are
equal in the civilian, military, and police spheres;
d) Prosecutor;
e) Investigator;
f) Court clerk;
g) Project leaders and treasurers;
h) Official in charge of the oil and gas sector

No

Politically Connected Position Group

4

Officials who are based on ministerial provisions in
charge of state apparatus affairs and bureaucratic reform

5

Organizers or members of political parties;

3

Score of Political
Connection
2
1

Source: The Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (2015)

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Agriculture Sector (SIC 1)
Mining Sector (SIC 2)
Basic Industry and Chemicals (SIC 3)
Miscellaneous Industry Sector (SIC 4)
Consumer Goods Sector (SIC 5)
Property, Real Estate, and Building
Construction Sector (SIC 6)
7) Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation (SIC 7)
8) Trade, Services, and Investment (SIC 9)
After conducting a regression in each
industry, the value of discretionary accruals
(DACC) was made absolute.
Measurement of Control Variables
This study used control variables that
referred to Alfraih (2017), Cheng et al.
(2015), Guedhami et al. (2014), and Habib

et al. (2017). Variables that were not included in the test, but could have an impact on
the results or make a difference in a biased
manner were classified as control variables.
Some control variables used were company
size (SIZE), leverage (DER), proportion of
independent directors (BIND), board diversity (BDIV), and board size (BSIZE). Company size (SIZE) was measured by calculating the natural logarithm of total assets.
Leverage was measured using Debt to Equity Ratio (DER). The proportion of independent directors (BIND) was calculated by
dividing the number of members of the
board of directors from outside the company
by the total number of directors multiplied
by 100%. Board diversity (BDIV) was
measured using a dummy variable that was
equal to 1 if a female director was present on
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std. Deviation

AC

1213

0.00

1.00

0.31

0.46

PCON
DACC

1213
1213

0.00
0.00

28.90
10.06

3.48
0.14

4.98
0.45

SIZE

1213

22.76

33.32

28.61

1.67

DER
BIND

1213
1213

0.00
0.00

16.83
1.00

0.59
0.20

0.96
0.14

BDIV

1213

0.00

2.00

0.43

0.50

BSIZE 1213
1.00
16.00
Source: Processed Data (2019)

4.74

1.91

AC
PCON
DACC
SIZE
DER

Audit quality
Corporate political connection
discretionary accruals
Company size
Leverage
Proportion of independent direcBIND
tors
Female representation on the board
BDIV
of directors of company
BSIZE Size of the board of directors
the board and a dummy variable was equal
to 0 otherwise. The size of the board of directors (BSIZE) was measured by calculating the number of directors in the board of
directors of company i at period t.
RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Analysis
Based on Table 2, audit quality (AC)
variable consisting of industry specialist auditors and non-specialist auditors had an average value of 0.31 (31%), which indicated
that of the 1,213 firm-years of the sample
studied, there were 381 sample companies
that selected industry specialist auditors and
832 sample companies that selected nonspecialist auditors as their company’s auditors.

The PCON variable in the study had
an average value of 3.48, meaning that on
average, each company had at least a score
of 3.48 for politically connected commissioners and directors. The average DACC
value of 0.14 indicated that the average level
of earnings management (discretionary accruals) by companies was 14%. The company size variable (SIZE) in the study had an
average value of 28.61. The DER variable in
the study had an average value of 0.59,
meaning that on average, 59% of the total
assets of the companies were financed by
debt.
The proportion of independent directors (BIND) in the study had an average value of 0.20, where averagely, 20% of the
companies had an independent board of directors in its ranks. The representation of
female directors in the company's board of
directors (BDIV) in the study had an average
value of 0.43, meaning that on average, 43%
of the sample companies had female directors on the board. The variable of size of the
board of directors (BSIZE) in the study had
an average value of 4.74, meaning that the
average size of the board of directors in the
companies consisted of 4-5 people.
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Table 3
Results of Logistic Regression Test and Moderation Regression Analysis
Audit Quality (AC)
Equ.1

Variable

PCON
DACC

Equ.2

Β

p-value
(Sig.)

Β

p-value
(Sig.)

β

p-value
(Sig.)

0.06

0.018**

0.06
-0.018

0.018**
0.268

0.06
-0.017

0.018**
0.275

0.001

0.489

0.169
-0.044
-0.04
-0.037
0.058
0.070

<0.001***
0.063*
0.079*
0.1*
0.022**

PCON*DACC
SIZE
DER
BIND
BDIV
BSIZE
R-squared

Equ.3

0.171
-0.046
-0.041
-0.037
0.057
0.070

<0.001***
0.052*
0.078*
0.098*
0.023**

0.169
-0.044
-0.04
-0.037
0.058
0.070

<0.001***
0.063*
0.079*
0.1*
0.022**

Source: Processed Data (2019)
Annotation: The signs ***, ** and * each represent statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.

Research Result
The results of the regression testing of
the three hypothesis models using the control variables are summarized in Table 3.
Equation Model 1 revealed that the
coefficient of variable of company with politically connected boards of commissioners
and directors (PCON) was positive at 0.018
and significant. Hypothesis 1, which states
that corporate political connections have a
significant negative effect on audit quality,
had not been proven. This result is not in
line with studies conducted by Cheng et al.
(2015) and Habib et al. (2017), but supports
studies by Guedhami et al. (2014) and (Narayanaswamy 2013).
The results of this study proved that
companies with politically connected board
of commissioners or board of directors tended to appoint industry specialist auditors as
good-quality auditors that the company
needed.
In Equation Model 2 in Table 3, earnings management variable (DACC) showed
no significant effect. Meanwhile, in Equa-

tion Model 3, the interacting variable between the variables of political connections
and earnings management (PCON x DACC)
indicated no significant effect. These results
indicated that earnings management did not
moderate the effect of political connections
(PCON) on audit quality (AC). Hypothesis 2
was based on hypothesis 1 (there is a negative relationship between political connections and industry specialist). Because Hypothesis 1 in this study was not proven, the
argument of Hypothesis 2 became invalid.
SIZE showed a positive regression result <0.001 and was significant at a significance level (p-value) of less than α = 1%.
The results of this study were consistent
with research conducted by Cheng et al.
(2015) who found that large companies
tended to select reputable auditors. This was
also supported by Liu et al. (2017), who revealed that company size had a significant
positive effect, indicating that large companies were more likely to select high-quality
auditors.
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DER, BIND, and BDIV each showed
a negative and significant regression coefficient at a significance level (p-value) of less
than α = 10%. These results indicated that
the level of leverage, the proportion of independent boards of directors, and the representation of female directors in the board of
directors might discourage companies from
decision to select a good-quality auditor.
BSIZE showed a positive and significant
regression coefficient at a significance level
(p-value) less than α = 5%. The result of this
study, which stated that BSIZE affected auditor selection, supported the research of
Alfraih (2017) and Ianniello et al. (2015).
One unit increase in the size of the board of
directors lead to an increase in the possibility of selecting good-quality public accounting firm. Alfraih (2017) and Ianniello et al.
(2015) argued that a larger board made it
possible to select high-quality external auditors to mitigate organizational problems and
improve the perception of the quality of published financial statements.
Discussion
Effects of Political Connections on Audit
Quality
The Equation Model 1 in Table 3 revealed that the variable coefficient for companies with politically connected boards of
commissioners and directors (PCON) had a
significant positive effect. The results of the
study did not support Hypothesis 1 nor did
the research conducted by Cheng et al.
(2015) and Habib et al. (2017), which stated
that corporate political connections negatively affected auditor selection. However,
the result of this study was in line with
Guedhami et al. (2014) and Narayanaswamy (2013). The result of this study that
did not support Hypothesis 1 did not support
agency theory that implies that companies
with political connections, which are closely
related to the emergence of agency conflicts,
tend to minimize information disclosure
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(Rodríguez et al. 2007) and tend to report
poor quality financial statements (AlDhamari and Ku Ismail 2015; Chung et al.
2005).
The result of the study that discovered
a significant positive effect can be explained
by several reasons. The first reason is that
companies with a board of commissioners or
directors who have political connections in
Indonesia tend to appoint industry specialist
auditors because they are considered to be of
good quality as a mechanism to reduce
agency problems and suspicion of information asymmetry. Companies with political
connections tend to appoint industry specialist auditors as a company commitment to
show the public that people involved in
these companies also improve accounting
transparency and convince investors that
companies refrain from exploiting their connections to divert company resources in the
interest of personal. Auditor of a company is
appointed by the board of directors. The
board of commissioners must supervise and
have the right to give approval to the Annual
Operating Plan and Budget submitted by the
board of directors.
The second reason is the decision to
select qualified auditors can enable politically connected companies to eliminate criticism about the quality of their financial reporting by creating better governance and
control. The argument of the result of this
study is in accordance with Guedhami et al.
(2014) and Narayanaswamy (2013). This
argument is also consistent with agency theory in which the agent engages with highquality auditors to limit the possibility of
rent seeking. The decision to select an independent external auditor as a monitoring role
on behalf of the owner/shareholder becomes
an important component of corporate governance because it can help improve the
credibility of accounting information provided by management (Abdel-Khalik 2002;
Lin and Liu 2009). Balsam et al. (2003)
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argued that industry specialist auditors offered a higher level of assurance than nonspecialist auditors because of the auditor's
specialized knowledge of the industry and
accounting in the industry. Therefore, the
appointment of auditors with industry specialization will help reduce earnings management. Auditors who specialize in the client industry are expected to provide higherquality audit than non-specialist auditors do
(Abbott and Parker 2000).
Profit Management as a Moderating Role
of The Effect of Corporate Political Connections on Audit Quality
In Equation Model 3 in Table 3, the
interacting variable between variables of political connections and earnings management
(PCONXDACC) had no significant effect. It
meant that the earnings management variable (DACC) did not moderate the effect of
the political connections (PCON) on audit
quality (AC). Based on these results, Hypothesis 2 was not successfully supported.
Hypothesis 2 was based on Hypothesis 1
(there is a negative relationship between political connections and industry specialist)
and because Hypothesis 1 in this study was
not proven, the argument of Hypothesis 2
became invalid. The result of Hypothesis 2
did not support the research conducted by
Chaney et al. (2011), Cheng et al. (2015),
and Hashmi et al. (2018). It meant that companies with political connections in Indonesia that selected industry specialist auditors
did not have the incentive to manage earnings and report low quality earnings.
CONCLUSION
In agency theory, as a manifestation of
management’s accountability to principals,
agents are obliged to run the company and
produce financial reports. The financial
statements describe the condition of the
company’s financial performance that will
be used by principals as a basis for decision

making. Management engages with highquality auditors to limit the possibility of
rent seeking and supports the quality of good
financial statements.
Empirical results revealed that politically connected boards of commissioners
and directors in a company had a significant
positive effect on audit quality. The results
of this study have proven that companies
with a board of commissioners or board of
directors who have political connections
tended to select industry specialist auditors
who can support the company’s commitment
in implementing GCG practices. It meant
that corporate political connections were
used positively in the auditor selection decision (audit quality). Politically connected
companies in Indonesia have proven to be
committed to developing businesses in accordance with good corporate governance
(GCG). This was evidenced by the participation of several politically connected companies in the Annual Report Award (ARA) and
Good Corporate Governance Award
(GCGA). It proved that these companies
were trying to improve the quality of information transparency in the annual report.
The next result of this study was that
earnings management did not moderate the
effect of corporate political connections on
audit quality because the politically connected companies in Indonesia were committed
to implement good corporate governance
practices. The implementation of good corporate governance can provide higher quality financial reporting. Thus, good corporate
governance can reduce the risk perceived by
the public and auditors about politically
connected companies regarding business
failures and possible reporting errors
(Wahab et al. 2011). In addition, good corporate governance can show demand for
more comprehensive audits from auditors
because companies want the public to recognize that they have reliable financial reports and are not subject to governmen
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assistance or bailouts in the future (Wahab et
al. 2011).
The results of this study provide several contributions. The first contribution is to
provide empirical evidence that fot the
2015-2017 period, politically connected
companies in Indonesia did not make use of
their political connections for bad purpose,
for example, preserving and covering company’s political interests. This study precisely illustrated that politically connected companies made use of their political connections positively by selecting industry specialist auditors who can support the company’s commitment to GCG practices. This
was implemented by the company for the
sake of corporate accountability and business continuity to realize shareholder value
in the long term while still taking into account the interests of other stakeholders
based on ethical values and laws and regulations. The results of this study can also provide an overview for investors and other institutions (private, public, or state-owned
enterprises) regarding the reasons why politically connected companies appoint industry
specialist auditors as external auditors.
Several previous studies in Indonesia
that discussed a lot about the effect of political connections were focused on tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance, so the second
contribution of this study is to provide other
empirical evidence about the use of political
connections in the business environment in
Indonesia. The third contribution is that this
study provides another measurement alternative to the variables of political connection
and audit quality that can be used for further
research. The limitation in this research is
the difficulty in obtaining credible information and data in revealing the business
environment of industry specialist auditors
and non-specialist auditors in Indonesia that
are used in proxy of audit quality. Credible
journals that discuss the business environment related to industry specialist auditors
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and non-specialist auditors in Indonesia are
still limited. Thus, this study only used information sourced from foreign literature
without adjusting to the context in Indonesia. In addition, the Indonesian Institute of
Certified Public Accountants also does not
have data or information related to industry
specialist auditors, non-specialist auditors,
big-10 auditors, and non-big-10 auditors in
Indonesia.
Future studies can search for alternative proxies of audit quality that are more
suitable and relevant to be applied in Indonesia. Then, further studies can develop the
effect of political connections in Indonesia
on audit quality and executive compensation. Political connection and its relationship
with audit quality and executive compensation are still rarely studied in Indonesia.
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